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Abstract 
 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been mandated by the 
Congressional funding bill of 2012 to open the National Airspace System 
(NAS) to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). With the growing use of 
unmanned systems, NASA has established a multi-center “UAS 
Integration in the NAS” Project, in collaboration with the FAA and 
industry, and is guiding its research efforts to look at and examine crucial 
safety concerns regarding the integration of UAS into the NAS. Key 
research efforts are addressing requirements for detect-and-avoid (DAA), 
self-separation (SS), and collision avoidance (CA) technologies. In one of 
a series of human-in-the-loop experiments, NASA Langley Research 
Center set up a study known as Collision Avoidance, Self-Separation, and 
Alerting Times (CASSAT). The first phase assessed active air traffic 
controller interactions with DAA systems and the second phase examined 
reactions to the DAA system and displays by UAS Pilots at a simulated 
ground control station (GCS). Analyses of the test results from Phase I 
and Phase II are presented in this paper. Results from the CASSAT study 
and previous human-in-the-loop experiments will play a crucial role in the 
FAA’s establishment of rules, regulations, and procedures to safely, 
efficiently, and effectively integrate UAS into the NAS. 
Introduction 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have become the forefront of aviation technology and will 
soon be commonplace in the National Airspace System (NAS) as a result of the Congressional 
funding bill of 2012, which mandated the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to open the NAS 
to UAS. In response to this effort, and with safety being the primary concern, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has established a “UAS Integration in the NAS” 
project that spans four NASA centers, in collaboration with the FAA and industry, to examine 
essential safety concerns regarding the integration of UAS in the NAS. Routine access to the NAS 
will require UAS to have new equipage, minimum operations standards, rules and regulations, and 
procedures.  Many supporting research efforts will be required to answer difficult questions 
concerning these standards, regulations, and procedures. Detect-and-avoid (DAA) 
implementations, self-separation (SS) procedures, and collision avoidance (CA) technologies to 
remain well-clear of other aircraft are top research priorities in assuring safe integration. Research 
efforts at NASA Langley Research Center are guiding the answer to those difficult questions to 
assure safe and efficient integration of UAS into the NAS. The present study focuses on DAA 
system acceptability to both air traffic controllers and pilots of UAS and is entitled Collision 
Avoidance, Self-Separation, and Alerting Times (CASSAT) human-in-the-loop experiment – a 
two-phase study and the third in a series of Controller Acceptability Studies (CAS). 
 
Many hurdles accompany the safe integration of UAS in the NAS, including the requirement to 
see-and-avoid other aircraft per Title 14 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
14, Parts 91.111 and 91.113 and other applicable regulations and accepted practices. Pilots are 
required to follow right-of-way rules and remain well clear of other aircraft. In all airspace classes, 
pilots are expected to comply with these see-and-avoid requirements while also complying with 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) instructions and clearances or to negotiate changes to these instructions 
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and/or clearances as necessary. See-and-avoid capable pilots are generally expected to maneuver 
and communicate in predictable ways and in a manner that preserves the safety, orderliness, and 
efficiency of the Airspace system when operating in a positive control environment. UAS will 
likely be expected to operate in a similar manner, but with DAA replacing the see-and-avoid 
capability of a manned aircraft. The acceptable design space and capabilities for DAA systems in 
this environment are largely undefined. CAS-1 and CAS-2 controller-in-the-loop simulation 
experiments sought to illuminate the DAA design space for UAS operating in a positive control 
ATC environment. Reports on the CAS-1 study may be found in Chamberlain, Consiglio, 
Comstock, Ghatas, and Muñoz (2015), and Ghatas, Comstock, Consiglio, Chamberlain, and 
Hoffler (2015). Reports on the CAS-2 study may be found in both a NASA Technical 
Memorandum (TM), Comstock, Ghatas, Consiglio, Chamberlain, and Hoffler (2015), and in a 
conference proceedings paper, Comstock, Ghatas, Consiglio, Chamberlain, and Hoffler (2015). 
As an extension of CAS-1 and CAS-2, CASSAT focused on addressing minimum and maximum 
acceptable declaration times for projected well clear losses from the perspective of active air traffic 
controllers and of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) rated pilots and explored alerting structures as 
DAA and CA functions are integrated. 
 
The DAA technology employed in the present study worked much like the algorithms in the Traffic 
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), but with a Self-Separation Volume (SSV), also 
referred to as the well-clear volume, that was large enough to avoid (a) corrective Resolution 
Advisories (RAs) for TCAS equipped intruders; (b) safety concerns for controllers; and, (c) undue 
concern for proximate see-and-avoid pilots.  The present series of studies sought to determine 
operationally acceptable SSV sizes and look-ahead prediction times to inform system designers 
about required DAA surveillance range and accuracy.  Guidance from the DAA system was 
provided to the UAS pilot to maintain positions outside the well-clear boundary.  Details of the 
self-separation guidance shown to the UAS pilots to maintain well-clear may be found in the CAS-
1 paper (Chamberlain, et al., 2015).   
 
In addition to avoiding the issuance of TCAS RAs, the DAA system should also be designed to 
prevent the issuance of traffic alerts, avoid capturing the attention of, or otherwise precluding 
increases in workload, or prevent additional vectoring requirements for ATC and the UAS pilot.  
This work attempts to provide guidance for DAA standards for “well clear” (following 14 CFR 
§91.113) that consider these ATC and UAS pilot concerns. Further information may also be found 
in Consiglio et al. (2015). 
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Phase I – Air Traffic Controller Acceptability Study 
1. Phase I General Information 
1.1 Approach and Objectives 
The primary focus of the Phase I portion of the Collision Avoidance, Self-Separation, and Alerting 
Times (CASSAT) experiment was to address minimum and maximum acceptable declaration 
times for projected well clear losses from the perspective of active air traffic controllers. In this 
simulation study, controllers managed a mix of manned aircraft and DAA-equipped UAS traffic 
and provided ratings on acceptability of Horizontal Miss Distances (HMDs) (see section 2.7.1) 
when near traffic encounters occurred, acceptability of alerting times, and workload ratings during 
test sessions. 
 
The following research questions, which drove the experiment design, were proposed: 
A. Given a projected well clear loss, which of the three values evaluated is the minimum 
acceptable alert time? 
B. Given a projected well clear loss, which of the three values evaluated is the maximum 
acceptable alert time? 
C. Which, if any, of the alert times are too excessive leading to nuisance alerts for the air 
traffic controllers? 
D. Is there an interaction between Alerting Time and Horizontal Miss Distance? 
2. Phase I Method 
2.1 Subjects 
Eleven active Air Traffic Controllers, with no experience at the Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) East-
side facility, were recruited to perform traffic separation tasks for the scenarios developed in the 
phase I study.  Each of the controllers was the sole controller and performed ATC tasks in the 
simulated DFW East-side environment over a span of three days. To maintain a near real-world 
environment and workload similar to that of actual DFW traffic, background traffic was controlled 
by pseudo-pilots at two separate pilot stations located in another room within the Air Traffic 
Operations Laboratory (ATOL, see Appendix A for the layout). UAS aircraft were controlled by 
two additional pseudo-pilots each having access to Ground Control Station (GCS) displays 
showing the self-separation guidance information in real-time; ground control stations were 
located in a third separate room within the ATOL. Pseudo-pilots in this study refer to pilots who 
were either part of the research team or were trained and hired by the research team to regularly 
participate in the CAS studies. ATC subjects were also in communications with other controllers 
at towers and adjacent airspace who handled handoffs to and from the subject controller’s airspace. 
These “other” controllers were trained and hired by the research team to regularly participate in 
the CAS studies. For a visual representation of the lab layout, please see Appendix A. 
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2.2 Procedure 
The traffic scenarios were designed so that there were 14 UAS traffic encounters per scenario 
session for six hours of evaluation, with each scenario session lasting approximately one hour. An 
initial questionnaire (Appendix B) and training occurred on day one. On day two, additional 
training runs were conducted followed by the first three hours of testing with the remaining three 
hours of testing on day three. UAS aircraft were controlled by two pseudo-pilots, each having 
access to GCS displays showing the DAA self-separation guidance information in real-time. 
Background traffic, to maintain the environment and workload close to that of actual DFW traffic, 
was controlled by pseudo-pilots at two additional pilot stations. The controller managed the 
manned and unmanned traffic which were all flying in the same airspace (DFW East side) and 
communicating with ATC by simulated Very High Frequency (VHF) radio communications. 
Communications with the UAS were handled the same as manned aircraft communications. The 
auditory communications with the UAS had a 400 millisecond (msec) delay each way to simulate 
terrestrial link and digital link delays.  Prior results from the CAS-2 study showed that 400 msec 
delays were not a problem for controllers and often not noticed.  UAS traffic encounters were 
between the UAS and Visual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic that was transmitting position and altitude 
information (transponding) but not in voice communications with ATC.  This meant that if a 
maneuver was required to maintain separation, the UAS would make the maneuver.  Additional 
IFR and VFR traffic present was traffic taking off, landing, or transitioning the airspace and 
communicating with the controller. Background traffic in the airspace consisted of about 50 
aircraft per hour which were a mix of IFR and VFR aircraft.  
 
2.3 Independent Variables 
To address the research questions noted above, multiple independent variable of interest were 
examined, which included: 
1. Horizontal Miss Distance (HMD). There was an adjustable parameter used in the DAA 
self-separation algorithms that yields a given HMD if the UAS pilot flies just at the edge 
of the navigation display guidance “bands.”  See Chamberlain et al. (2015) for details.  The 
UAS pilots who were part of the research team would fly at the edge of this guidance, 
yielding the desired HMD for each particular encounter distance, so that controllers could 
evaluate that distance. Simulator data yielded the actual Closest Point of Approach (CPA) 
during the encounter as a check to insure that the desired HMD was obtained. The 
controller observed the miss distance and geometry on the radar scope and evaluate the 
acceptability of that HMD. 
2. Alerting Time. The amount of lead time the guidance presented to the UAS pilot before 
loss of well clear. 
3. Encounter Geometry. The geometry between the aircraft in the encounter situation and the 
speed differentials between the encountering aircraft. The variable of interest for a minority 
of encounters (vertical encounters) was a “look-ahead” parameter of Time to Co-altitude 
(TCOA) that was used by the Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems 
(DAIDALUS) algorithms. 
 
The parameters of these independent variables are shown in Table 1. Additionally, two variables 
that were manipulated in the earlier CAS-1 and CAS-2 studies were held constant for this study. 
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These were a fixed wind profile of 21 knots at 3000 feet and a fixed 400 msec voice 
communications delay with the UAS pilot. 
 
Table 1 - Independent Variables for Phase I 
Independent Values Number Values 
Horizontal Miss Distances 
(HMD) 
3 values 0.7, 1.0, 1.5  Nautical Miles (nmi) 
Alerting Time (used by 
DAIDALUS algorithms) 
3 values 30, 45, and 75 seconds 
Encounter Geometry 5 values 
Head-on, Overtake, Crossing, Vertical Overtake, 
Vertical Crossing 
Time to Co-altitude (TCOA) 
for vertical encounters (used 
by DAIDALUS algorithms) 
2 values 0 and 20 seconds 
 
The encounter geometries noted in Table 1, had the following specifications. Head-on: intruder 
(VFR manned) track at 180 degrees from ownship (UAS) +/- 15 degrees; Crossing: intruder track 
at 90 degrees from ownship +/- 15 degrees; Over-take: intruder track at 0 degrees from ownship 
+/- 15 degrees. The encounter speed differential for crossing geometries was +/- 60 knots. A single 
speed differential was used for head-on and over-take encounters. A sample of encounter 
geometries can be found in Appendix C. 
2.4 Scenarios 
The airspace modeled for this experiment was a portion of airspace delegated to the DFW Terminal 
Radar Approach Control Facility (TRACON) (D10), specifically, Sector DN/AR-7 South Flow.  
The majority of UAS traffic arrived or departed McKinney National (FAA airport identifier: 
KTKI), formerly known as Collin County Regional, and is approximately 28 nautical miles (nmi) 
Northeast of DFW. The scenarios were designed and situated in this airspace so as to enable 
various encounter geometries between the UAS and intruder aircraft while manned aircraft traffic 
was handled in order to achieve realistic levels of workload for the Controllers.  A chart of the area 
that was used in the initial training session on Day 1 is shown in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1. Chart used in initial training showing McKinney National (KTKI), upper right; DFW 
is in the lower left. 
 
The three HMD values (shown in Table 1) were varied within the test hours such that a given 
encounter might follow an encounter with a different HMD. The alert time remained constant for 
each test hour. For a given test hour, there were 14 encounters consisting of six crossing 
encounters, three head-on encounters, three overtake encounters, and two vertical encounters. Each 
subject controlled traffic for six test hours across two days for a total of 84 encounters. Nine 
hundred and twenty-four (924) encounters were made for a total of eleven (11) air traffic controller 
test subjects. 
 
2.5 Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance Assumptions 
The experiment assumed Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) architectures and 
capabilities appropriate for current-day operations in the applicable airspace classes, and that these 
capabilities were available to all aircraft (manned and unmanned) in the simulation environment. 
UAS were communicating with ATC in a similar manner to the manned aircraft. The intruders 
were VFR traffic that were transponding but were not in voice communications with ATC. UAS 
command, control, and communication capability was assumed available between Unmanned 
Aircraft (UA) and their respective GCS. The UA was assumed to be capable of 
receiving/transmitting voice communications to and from ATC facilities and proximate “party-
line” aircraft via VHF radio in the same manner as manned aircraft in the same airspace and of 
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relaying these voice communications to/from the GCS pilot via one or more UA-GCS links. “Party 
line” refers to the open radio channel through which all aircraft in a given airspace communicate 
ATC; pilots are able to hear their own clearances in addition to those of the other aircraft. It was 
further assumed that, in addition to the relayed voice communications, the UA-GCS link(s) carried 
all command/control data between the UAS and GCS. The communications delays were for the 
voice communications channel only and no delay was introduced for UAS control or position 
reporting. This study assumed large size UAS (e.g., Predator or Global Hawk class). For Phase I, 
the UAS GCS pilots were confederate participants (not subjects). It was assumed that surveillance 
sensors applicable to support DAA were available and functioned without failures. 
 
2.6 Software, Hardware, and Facilities 
The displays for the UAS and manned aircraft control stations and the ATC displays were driven 
by modified versions of the Multi Aircraft Control System (MACS) software (Prevot, 2002), 
running on Windows-based computers. Modifications included incorporation of DAIDALUS 
algorithms to drive Navigation display “bands” which indicated a range of headings that would 
result in a loss of well clear with one or more traffic aircraft (Consiglio et al., 2015). The 
DAIDALUS algorithms are an update of the Stratway+ algorithms used in prior controller 
acceptability studies. These displays provided the information which guided UAS pilots to make 
requests for maneuvers in the encounter scenarios. Details of the appearance of the Navigation 
display “bands” can be found in the CAS-1 report (Chamberlain et. al., 2015). Additional 
information on the DAA algorithms may be found in Hagen, Butler, and Maddalon, 2011, and 
Muñoz et al. (2014).  
 
2.7 Dependent Variables 
 
2.7.1 Horizontal Miss Distance. After each traffic encounter, an ATC subject matter expert 
seated next to the Controller subject asked: “How was the spacing of that last encounter?” or “How 
acceptable was the miss distance in the previous encounter?” Subjects had a copy of the 
information shown in Table 2 available to them during the test sessions. They were briefed that 
fractional responses, such as 1.5 or 3.5, were completely acceptable. If time permitted, an 
explanation for the rating was asked and noted. 
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Table 2 - Rating scale definitions used for assessment of Horizontal Miss Distance (HMD). 
(Note that fractional values, e.g., 1.5, were acceptable) 
1 
Much too close; unsafe or potentially so; cause or 
potential cause for issuance of a traffic alert 
2 Somewhat close, some cause for concern 
3 
Neither unsafely close nor disruptively large, did not 
perceive the encounter to be an issue 
4 
Somewhat wide, a bit unexpected; might be disruptive 
or potentially disruptive in congested airspace and/or 
with high workload 
5 
Excessively wide, unexpected; disruptive or 
potentially disruptive in congested airspace and/or 
with high workload 
 
 
2.7.2 Alerting Times. In addition to the HMD rating after each encounter, a rating was requested 
on the timing of the maneuver request using the scale shown in Table 3. Subjects had a copy of 
the scale definitions available to them during the test sessions. 
 
Table 3 - Rating scale definitions used for assessment of Maneuver Request Timing. 
A 
Too Early: Request made too early; potentially 
disruptive if a maneuver not required 
A/B Between A and B 
B 
Timing Okay:  Not too early or too late; timing of 
request completely acceptable 
B/C Between B and C 
C 
Too Late: Request made too late; potentially 
disruptive to adjacent traffic if a large maneuver 
required 
 
 
2.7.3 Workload Assessment.  About every five minutes during each hour long test session, a 
workload rating was requested. This was done similar to the Air Traffic Workload Input Technique 
(ATWIT) method of workload assessment (Stein, 1985). A scale with numbers from 1 to 6 was 
presented at the top of the ATC display and the subject clicked on their selection (one of the 
numbers 1-6) when prompted (i.e., an aurally presented “Ding” – through headphones – occurred 
and the rating scale turned yellow). ATC test subjects were briefed on definitions of the 1 to 6 
scale during the training and also had the scale definitions available during the test sessions. For 
this study, the scale definitions were: 1 – Minimal mental effort required; 2 – Low mental effort 
required; 3 – Moderate mental effort required; 4 – High mental effort required; 5 – Maximal mental 
effort required; and, 6 – Intense mental effort required. Appendix D shows the scale definitions 
table handout that was provided to the subjects. 
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2.7.4 System Performance Metrics. Data concerning the encounter aircraft separation 
distances were recorded throughout the period of the encounter and included aircraft-to-aircraft 
separation distances and time to the Closest Point of Approach (CPA). Data was also obtained on 
the DAA band information presented to the GCS pilots when flying the traffic encounters. 
 
2.7.5 Post-run Questionnaires. After each one-hour test session, a questionnaire was 
administered to each subject to record ratings and comments on the preceding test session 
(Appendix E). Specific topics addressed included: 1 – Effects of communications delay; 2 – 
Realism of traffic density; 3 – Realism of workload; and, 4 – Realism of communications rate. 
3. Phase I Results 
3.1 Horizontal Miss Distance Ratings 
Traffic encounters between DAA equipped UAS and manned aircraft that were transmitting 
position and altitude information (transponding), but not in voice communications with ATC 
occurred 14 times in a test session hour. After each encounter, ratings using the scale shown in 
Table 2 were obtained. Figure 2 shows the controller ratings for Crossing Geometry Encounters 
for each of the Horizontal Miss Distances under test. The figure shows a greater frequency of “too 
close” or “somewhat close” responses for the 0.7 nmi HMD, and these “close” responses 
diminished somewhat for the 1.0 nmi HMD and were nearly non-existent for the 1.5 nmi HMD. 
For the 1.5 nmi HMD, there were an increased frequency of responses on the “wide” end of the 
rating scale. These results confirm for active controllers the results found in CAS-1 and CAS-2 
with retired controllers. 
 
Figure 3 shows similar results for the overtake encounters, where the DAA equipped UAS was 
overtaking the manned aircraft. Figure 4 show the rating results for the head-on geometry cases. 
Both of these encounter geometries show similar distributions to the crossing encounter geometry 
case described above. The highest frequency of “3” response, defined as “Neither unsafely close 
nor disruptively large, did not perceive the encounter to be an issue,” occurred at the 1.0 and 1.5 
nmi HMD values. These results were consistent with the prior CAS-1 and CAS-2 results, even 
with the change from 0.5 to 0.7 nmi for the smallest HMD. 
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Figure 2. Controller ratings for Crossing Geometry Encounters by Horizontal Miss Distance. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Controller ratings for Overtake Geometry Encounters by Horizontal Miss Distance. 
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Figure 4. Controller ratings for Head-on Geometry Encounters by Horizontal Miss Distance. 
 
3.2 Alerting Times Ratings 
The alert time was a parameter set in the UAS DAA software and can be thought of as analogous 
to the beam of a flashlight at night which permits seeing things out to a certain distance. The alert 
time represented the DAA detection time before loss of well clear. The Alert Time values under 
test for Phase I of the study were 30, 45, and 75 seconds. The well clear boundary was defined for 
all cases as 30 seconds before the CPA, meaning that the total look ahead times were 30+30=60, 
30+45=75, and 30+75=105 seconds. The objective of the DAA system is to keep the aircraft 
outside the 30 second well clear boundary by having the addition of the alert time. 
 
The impact of Alert Time is indirect for the controller, as it would be evidenced by the timing of 
when the UAS pilot facing an encounter requiring maneuvering called to request a maneuver to 
avoid the traffic. Figure 5 shows the controller miss distance ratings across all HMD values for 
each of the Alert Times. Changes in alert times for the displays for the UAS pilots did not reflect 
any systematic difference in the HMD ratings by the controllers. 
 
Figure 6 shows the results of the Maneuver Request Timing Rating made by the controllers using 
the scale shown in Table 3. It should be noted that there were many cases in which the controller 
called the UAS traffic before the traffic made a call to ATC, so no timing rating was available in 
such cases. The percentage of cases in which the controller called the traffic first, or for other 
reasons a rating was not made, were 49.3% for the 30 second alert time, 51.5% for the 45 second 
alert time, and 36.0% for the 75 second alert time. For the cases where a rating was made, it is 
interesting to note that the most frequent response “B - Timing Okay” was made for all alert time 
values. It is also interesting to note that there were no “A – Too Early” responses for the 30 second 
alert time. Also worth noting is that there were very few “C – Too Late” ratings for any of the 
Alert Time values. 
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Figure 5. Controller miss distance ratings for Crossing Encounters by UAS alert times of 30, 45, 
and 75 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 6. Controller timing rating for Crossing Encounters by UAS alert times of 30, 45, and 75 
seconds. 
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4. Phase I Discussion 
The research questions for Phase I will be repeated here so that results related to each question can 
be explored. 
 
A. Given a projected well clear loss, which of the three values evaluated is the minimum 
acceptable alert time? 
B. Given a projected well clear loss, which of the three values evaluated is the maximum 
acceptable alert time? 
C. Which, if any, of the alert times are too excessive leading to nuisance alerts for the air traffic 
controllers? 
 
As previously noted, the values of alert time in the DAA algorithm have only an indirect effect on 
the air traffic controller as the timing may be reflected in when the UAS pilot calls ATC to request 
a maneuver. Examination of controller ratings on the Maneuver Request Timing scale showed no 
consistent effects by the Alert Time. As noted in Section 3.2, there were many cases in which the 
controller notified the UAS pilot of the traffic before the pilot made a call to the controller. That 
provides a rationale for why, in Figure 6, there were no ratings at the “too late” end of the scale as 
the controller would have already called those aircraft. On the opposite end of Figure 6, the 
magnitude of ratings for “A = Too Early” roughly align with the magnitude of the alert times. 
However, the most frequent responses for all alert times was “B = Timing Okay.” Therefore, of 
the times tested, none appear to consistently fall into the “A = Too Early” category, which may 
lead to a nuisance alert. 
 
D. Is there an interaction between Alerting Time and Horizontal Miss Distance? 
 
From the ATC rating data, there appears to be no interaction between the Alerting Time and the 
HMD. The separation distances are directly observable by the controller, and as noted, the alerting 
time is only noticeable indirectly through a call from a UAS when a traffic maneuver is needed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
Phase II – Pilot Acceptability Study 
5. Phase II General Information 
5.1 Approach and Objectives 
The primary focus of the Phase II portion of the CASSAT experiment was to address minimum 
and maximum acceptable declaration times for projected well clear losses from the perspective of 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) rated pilots with and without experience controlling large size UAS, 
such as a Predator or Global Hawk. In this phase of CASSAT, pilots controlled simulated DAA-
equipped UA and provided ratings on acceptability of distance-threshold (DTHR) values when 
near traffic encounters occurred, acceptability of alerting times, workload ratings during test 
conditions, and feedback regarding the Alerting Structure.  The DTHR value is the distance that 
the DAIDALUS algorithms use to provide band guidance to the pilot, and was experimentally 
varied in the study.  DTHR is used in this phase of the study to avoid confusion with the use of 
HMD as a fixed minimum value that constitutes a well clear loss, which may not be same as the 
DTHR value. 
 
The following research questions, which drove the experiment design, were proposed: 
A. Given a projected well clear loss, which of the three values evaluated is the minimum 
acceptable alert time? 
B. Given a projected well clear loss, which of the three values evaluated is the minimum 
acceptable alert time? 
C. Which, if any, of the alert times are too excessive leading to nuisance alerts for the UA 
pilots? 
D. Which, if any, of the alert times are too short providing insufficient time to query/negotiate 
maneuvers with ATC and execute said maneuvers before triggering TCAS RAs? 
E. Is there an interaction between Alerting Time and DTHR? 
F. Which of two candidate alerting structures, with different use of auditory cues and icon 
colors, is preferred by the UA pilot? 
G. In Vertical Encounters, does prediction of time to co-altitude (TCOA) affect acceptability 
of the Alert? 
6. Phase II Method 
6.1 Subjects 
Twelve pilots from across the country were recruited to perform traffic separation tasks for the 
scenarios developed. All twelve of the pilots were instrument rated; six of the twelve pilots had 
experience flying manned aircraft exclusively while the remaining six had additional experience 
flying unmanned aircraft, such as Predators and Global Hawks. Pilots participated for two days 
each, and each data collection session consisted of two subject pilots independently flying a 
simulated UAS in the DFW East-side airspace. On Day 1, subjects were trained on the DFW 
airspace, the DAA concept, the simulation environment, and were given an initial questionnaire 
(Appendix F). All subjects had experience communicating with ATC and were current in their 
pilot ratings and certifications. 
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6.2 Procedure 
Similar to Phase I, the traffic scenarios were designed so that there were 14 UAS traffic encounters 
per hour, and there were a total of six test hour sets split between the two data collection days. 
Traffic scenarios were split between two ground control stations so that each pilot saw seven UAS 
traffic encounters during each test hour for a total of 42 encounters per pilot, and for all twelve 
subjects, this meant a set of data with 504 encounters. Both ground control stations displayed the 
DAA self-separation guidance information in real-time along with one of two alerting structures. 
Additionally, GCS-1 was set to a TCOA of 0 and GCS-2 was set to a TCOA value of 20 – these 
TCOA values remained constant throughout the experiment. The pilots switched seats on Day 2 
to allow exposure to each TCOA value. This TCOA value parameter only affected traffic 
encounters approaching vertically (from above or below). The two alerting structures, which 
contained different levels of aural and visual cues to alert pilots of oncoming and/or nearby traffic, 
were presented to the pilots subjects (see section 6.3 Independent Variables). One alerting structure 
was shown to the pilots on Day 1, and on Day 2, the pilots saw the other alerting structure. The 
order of presentation of alerting structures was counterbalanced across the six pairs of test subjects. 
To maintain a real-world environment and a workload similar to that of actual DFW traffic, the 
background traffic was controlled by two pseudo-pilots at two additional pilot stations located in 
a separate simulation room. The DFW East-side controller, with whom the test subjects were 
communicating, was part of the research team. 
 
The pilot subjects began control of a given UAS with the aircraft already in flight by a handoff 
process, and when the aircraft completed the traffic encounter, control was handed off to a research 
team pilot. Each subject controlled one aircraft at a time and as a result, there was sufficient time 
between controlling each aircraft so that post-encounter questions could be answered and rating 
scales completed. Two pilots using separate GCS stations were run at the same time. To increase 
workload and add some degree of distraction from just looking for traffic encounters to appear, 
members of the research team asked the pilot subjects questions that required each pilot to conduct 
a map search task while flying the UAS in the scenarios. Secondary task questions (Appendix G) 
were tailored to each test session so that the questions matched the map area in which the 
encounters were scripted to occur. 
 
As in Phase I, the voice communications channel had a 400msec two-way delay between the 
simulated UAS and ATC. Additional manned and unmanned traffic were also on the ATC 
frequency and could also be visible on the map display if within range, which was selectable by 
the pilots. This level of traffic meant that at times there could be delay in communicating with 
ATC due to voice traffic congestion. Similar to Phase I, traffic encounters were between the UAS 
and VFR traffic that was transmitting position and altitude information (transponding), but not in 
voice communications with ATC, thus all maneuvering, if required, was performed by the UAS.   
 
6.3 Independent Variables 
The independent variables evaluated in Phase II are shown in Table 4. There were some differences 
from those used in Phase I (shown back in Table 1). The first difference was in the case of head-
on geometry encounters in which a subset of runs were done at a 2.0 nmi DTHR (not tested in 
phase I) in addition to 0.7, 1.0, and 1.5 nmi.  Secondly, the alert times used in the DAA algorithms 
were changed to be 40, 60, and 75 seconds, in response to new information under discussion at 
standards organizations with regard to minimal alert times. The third difference was in the case of 
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the alerting structure that was displayed on the GCS station to the pilot subjects. Subjects were 
shown two separate alerting structures - Alerting Structure “A” (Figure 7) and Alerting Structure 
“B” (Figure 8). On Day 1, both subjects would see one alerting structure and the other alerting 
structure on Day 2; the order in which the alerting structures were presented changed for each pair 
of pilot subjects. Further information on the alerting structures may be found in Consiglio et al. 
(2015). 
 
Table 4 - Independent Variables for Phase II 
Independent Values Number Values 
Horizontal Miss Distances (DTHR) 3 or 4 values 
0.7, 1.0, and 1.5 nmi for Crossings and 
Overtakes 
 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0 nmi for Head-on cases 
Alerting Time (used by DAIDALUS 
algorithms) 
3 values 40, 60, and 75 seconds 
Encounter Geometry 5 values 
Head-on, Overtake, Crossing, Vertical 
Overtake, Vertical Crossing 
Time to Co-altitude (TCOA) for 
vertical encounters (used by 
DAIDALUS algorithms) 
2 values 0 and 20 seconds 
Alerting Structure 2 types “A” and “B” 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Alerting Structure "A"         Figure 8. Alerting Structure "B" 
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6.4 Scenarios 
Scenarios in Phase II were similar to those used in Phase I (refer to Section 2.4), with the 
exception of data collection being focused on the GCS pilots as opposed to the ATC controller.  
A member of the research team sat near each test subject to ask the secondary task (map search) 
questions and to ask encounter rating questions. 
 
6.5 Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance Assumptions 
Communications, navigation, and surveillance assumptions remained constant between Phase I 
and Phase II of the experiment. Please refer to Section 2.5 of this paper for more information. 
 
6.6 Software, Hardware, and Facilities 
Software, Hardware, and Facilities remained the same between both phases of the experiment. 
Please refer to Section 2.6 of this paper for more information. 
 
6.7 Dependent Variables 
 
6.7.1 Horizontal Miss Distance (DTHR).  Horizontal miss distances, or DTHR, were measured 
in the same manner as in Phase I. After each traffic encounter, a researcher, who was seated next 
to the pilot subjects, would ask “How was the spacing of that last encounter?” or “How acceptable 
was the miss distance in the previous encounter?” Subjects had a copy of the information shown 
in Table 2 available to them during the test sessions. They were briefed that fractional responses, 
such as 1.5 or 3.5, were acceptable. If time permitted, an explanation for the rating was asked and 
noted. Additionally, horizontal miss distances were also rated via an end-of-encounter 
questionnaire that was filled out by each subject after each encounter on a 7-point scale (0 = Much 
Too Close, 4 = About Right, 7 = Much Too Wide). Responses were scored on a 120 point range, 
since marks could occur between the 7 “tic” marks. 
 
6.7.2 Alert Times Ratings.  Ratings for alert times were requested on the timing of the maneuver 
request using the scale shown in Table 3. Subjects had a copy of the scale definitions available to 
them during the test sessions. The same researcher who asked questions regarding the horizontal 
miss distance would also ask the pilot subject “How was the alert time of that last encounter?” or 
“How acceptable was that alert time?” 
 
6.7.3 Workload Assessment.  A workload assessment was requested after each encounter and 
was filled out by each subject via the end-of-encounter questionnaire on a 7-point scale (0 = Low, 
7 = High). Responses were scored on a 120 point range, since marks could occur between the 7 
“tic” marks. Forty-two assessments of workload were collected from each subject. 
 
6.7.4 System Performance Metrics.  Data concerning the encounter aircraft separation 
distances were recorded throughout the period of the encounter and included aircraft-to-aircraft 
separation distances and time to the CPA. Data was also obtained on the DAA band information 
presented to the GCS pilots when flying the traffic encounters. 
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6.7.5 Secondary Task. In an attempt to increase workload and add some degree of distraction 
from just looking for traffic encounters to appear, members of the research team added a secondary 
task to the design of the experiment. Research team members asked questions that required the 
pilots to conduct a map search task while flying the UAS in the scenarios. 
 
6.7.6 Post-encounter Questionnaires. After each encounter in each one-hour test session, a 
questionnaire was administered to record ratings and comments on the preceding encounter 
(Appendix H). Specific topics addressed included: 1 – Timing of the alert; 2 – Horizontal miss 
distance; 3 –Navigation scale (scaled used on display to view surrounding area); 4 – Alert level 
information (volume of alert); 5 – False alerts; 6 – Missed alerts; 7 – Workload; and, 8 – Time 
Pressure. 
 
6.7.7 Post-run Questionnaires. After each one-hour test session, a questionnaire was 
administered to record ratings and comments on the preceding test session (Appendix I). Specific 
topics addressed included: 1 – Effects of communications delay; 2 – Realism of traffic density; 
3 – Realism of workload; 4 – Realism of communications rate; 5 – Usability of display; and 6 – 
Ease of use of alerting structure. 
7. Phase II Results 
7.1 Horizontal Miss Distance Ratings 
At the end of each traffic encounter, the GCS pilots were asked to rate the DTHR on the scale 
presented in Table 2. Figure 9 shows the distribution of their responses for the Crossing geometry 
encounters. This figure shows that the majority of the responses were a “3” on the scale indicating 
miss distances that were not too close or too wide. For the 0.7 nmi DTHR, over 30% of the ratings 
were on the “too close” or “somewhat close” end of the scale. For the 1.0 nmi DTHR encounters, 
ratings on this end of the scale dropped to about 20%, and for the 1.5 nmi DTHR dropped to about 
15%. 
 
Figure 10 shows the DTHR ratings for the overtake conditions. Here, about a third of the ratings 
for the 0.7 nmi DTHR were “somewhat close.” This dropped to about 20% for the 1.0 nmi distance, 
and to zero for the 1.5 nmi distance, where there were almost 20% of ratings on the “somewhat 
wide” end of the scale. 
 
Figure 11 shows similar ratings for the head-on encounters. For head-on encounters, an additional 
DTHR of 2.0 nmi was also tested. Over 70% of the ratings for DTHR of 0.7 and 1.0 nmi, and over 
80% for DTHR of 1.5 and 2.0 nmi indicated that the encounter separation distance was neither 
“too close” or “too wide” in the head-on geometry cases. 
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Figure 9. UAS Pilot ratings for Crossing Geometry Encounters with DTHR of 0.7, 1.0, and 1.5 
nmi (216 encounters). 
 
 
 
Figure 10. UAS Pilot ratings for Overtake Geometry Encounters with DTHR of 0.7, 1.0, and 1.5 
nmi (108 encounters). 
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Figure 11. UAS Pilot ratings for Head-on Geometry Encounters with DTHR of 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0 
nmi (108 encounters). 
 
7.2 Alert Times Ratings 
Three alert times values were tested during the study. These values are parameters in the 
DAIDALUS algorithm in software running on the GCS and were counterbalanced across the six 
one-hour test sessions, such that all three alert time values were presented on Day 1 and again on 
Day 2 of the study. Figure 12 shows the alert time ratings for the crossing geometry encounters.  
The majority of responses were in the “Timing Okay” category, with no systematic changes 
attributable to the alert time manipulation. 
 
Figure 13 shows the alert time ratings for the overtake geometry encounters where the majority of 
the rating responses were in the “Timing Okay” category, but with about 20% of responses in the 
“Between B and C” (between Okay and Too Late) category. This reflects the overtake geometry 
in which the smaller speed differential between the two aircraft result in getting closer in distance 
before the time-based algorithm indicates that it is time for a maneuver. As in the crossing case, 
no systematic differences are noted across the three alert times tested. 
 
Figure 14 shows the alert time ratings for the head-on case. As in the other alert time geometries, 
the majority (>75%) of ratings were in the “Timing Okay” category, regardless of the alert time 
value.  
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Figure 12. UAS Pilot ratings for Crossing Geometry Encounters with Alert Times of 40, 60, and 
75 seconds (A = Too Early, B = Timing Okay, C = Too Late). 
 
 
 
Figure 13. UAS Pilot ratings for Overtake Geometry Encounters with Alert Times of 40, 60, and 
75 seconds (A = Too Early, B = Timing Okay, C = Too Late). 
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Figure 14. UAS Pilot ratings for Head-on Geometry Encounters for Alert Times of 40, 60, and 
75 seconds (A = Too Early, B = Timing Okay, C = Too Late). 
 
7.3 Distance from Well Clear Boundary 
Figure 15 shows for the crossing geometry cases the mean distance outside the DTHR at the CPA 
that the UAS pilots flew the simulated aircraft in the traffic encounters.  The set of data comprising 
this figure included 216 encounters, of which only four had losses of well clear (negative distances, 
CPA< DTHR). The alert time did not appear to have any systematic effect on the CPA distances. 
 
Figure 16 shows similar information for the overtake encounters. In this geometry, there were 108 
encounters and six well clear losses. While no systematic differences occurred as a result of the 
alert time, the overall distances outside the DTHR for all DTHR values are smaller for the overtake 
geometry case than for either the crossing or head-on geometries. This may reflect the slower 
overtake speed differential leading to more time to fly closer to the DTHR boundary. 
 
Figure 17 shows similar information for the head-on geometry case, where there were a total of 
108 encounters and four losses of well clear. As in the crossing and overtake geometries, there 
were no systematic effects due to the alert time variable. 
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Figure 15. Mean distance from DTHR at CPA for Crossing Geometry Encounters for 40, 60, 
and 75 second Alert Times (216 encounters, 4 losses of well clear). Error bars denote standard 
deviations. 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Mean distance from DTHR at CPA for Overtake Geometry Encounters for 40, 60, 
and 75 second Alert Times (108 encounters, 6 losses of well clear). Error bars denote standard 
deviations. 
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Figure 17. Mean distance from DTHR at CPA for Head-on Geometry Encounters for 40, 60, and 
75 second Alert Times (108 encounters, 4 losses of well clear). Error bars denote standard 
deviations. 
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Table 5 - Cases where CPA was less than DTHR (Occurred in 17 of 504 encounters {3.37%}) 
Geometry 
HMD 
(nmi) 
CPA 
(nmi) 
Difference 
(nmi) 
Duration for 
CPA<DTHR (sec) 
Comment 
Head-On 1.5 1.47 -0.03 5.5 
Turned once, did not 
turn further 
Head-On 1.5 1.39 -0.11 12.5 
Started maneuver too 
late 
Head-On 1.5 1.39 -0.11 10 
Turned once, did not 
turn further 
Head-On 2.0 1.4 -0.60 25.1 
Overcorrection on 
return-to-course 
Crossing 0.7 0.1 -0.6 15.2 
Late acquisition of 
aircraft, no time to 
maneuver 
Crossing 0.7 0.64 -0.06 6 
Likely autopilot-
induced “drift” 
towards intruder 
Crossing 1.5 1.49 -0.01 5 
Overcorrection on 
return-to-course 
Crossing 1.5 1.09 -0.41 21 
Pilot turned right, 
then left; insufficient 
time to recover well 
clear 
Crossing 1.5 1.47 -0.03 8 
Overcorrection on 
return-to-course 
Overtake 1.0 0.94 -0.06 15.9 
Overcorrection on 
return-to-course 
Overtake 1.5 1.48 -0.02 18.7 
Overcorrection on 
return-to-course 
Overtake 1.5 1.49 -0.01 3.5 
Overcorrection on 
return-to-course 
Overtake 1.5 1.29 -0.21 42.1 
Overcorrection on 
return-to-course 
Overtake 1.5 1.38 -0.12 38.7 
Overcorrection on 
return-to-course 
Overtake 1.5 1.4 -0.10 10.5 
Overcorrection on 
return-to-course 
Vertical-
Crossing 
0.7 0.35 -0.35 9.5 
Started maneuver too 
late 
Vertical-
Overtake 
0.7 0.01 -0.69 17.1 
Pilot did not deviate 
laterally before Loss 
of Well Clear 
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7.4 Vertical Encounters 
Data were collected from a total of 72 vertical encounters in the study, meaning that each GCS 
pilot saw one in each hour, or six over the two days of testing. All vertical encounters had an 
DTHR of 0.7 nmi. Figure 18 shows the distance ratings by the GCS pilots and illustrates that a 
sizable proportion of these were considered “Too close” or “Somewhat close.” The alert time 
variable appeared to have no systematic effect on the distance ratings. 
 
As would be expected from the distance ratings noted above, the GCS pilot alert time ratings, 
shown in Figure 19, show a shift in responses towards the “Too Late” end of the scale compared 
to other encounter geometries. In Figure 19, the number of responses to the right of “Timing Ok,” 
or in the “Too Late” direction were 62.5% for 40 seconds alert time, 50.0% for the 60 seconds 
alert time, and 33.3% for the 75 seconds alert time. This makes intuitive sense as additional alert 
time should diminish “Too Late” responses.  
 
Figure 20 shows the distance from DTHR at the CPA for each of the alert times. There were only 
two losses of well clear among the 72 vertical encounters. This figure also shows a breakdown in 
the data set for a parameter in the DAA algorithm referred to as Time-to-Co-altitude (TCOA), a 
parameter considered useful in adding alert time to vertical encounters. In Figure 18, no difference 
appears attributable to the TCOA parameter, at least for the CPA data. Also worth noting in this 
figure is that 40 and 60 seconds alert time encounters were vertical overtakes, while 75 seconds 
alert time encounters were of the vertical crossing geometry. In agreement with non-vertical 
encounters presented earlier, the crossing geometry encounters have larger mean CPA - DTHR 
differences. 
 
 
 
Figure 18. UAS Pilot Distance ratings for Vertical Geometry Encounters for each Alert Time. 
All DTHR values were 0.7 for Vertical Geometry Encounters. 
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Figure 19. UAS Pilot Alert Time ratings for Vertical Geometry Encounters 
(A = Too Early, B = Timing Okay, C = Too Late). 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Mean distance from DTHR at CPA for Vertical Geometry Encounters for 40, 60, and 
75 second Alert Times and Time to Co-Altitude values of 0 and 20 seconds (72 encounters, 2 
losses of well clear). Encounters at 40 and 60 seconds are Vertical Overtake Encounters, 75 
second encounters are Vertical Crossing Encounters. Error bars denote standard deviations. 
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7.5 Alerting Structures 
At the end of every one-hour test session, each GCS pilot was asked to answer a series of fifteen 
questions on an end-of-hour questionnaire. Seven of the fifteen questions focused on the alerting 
structure that was presented to the pilot subjects on the GCS display and consisted of the following 
questions: 
 
1. Rate the ease of the display. 
2. Rate the ease of the alerting structure. 
3. Was the display user-friendly? 
4. Did the display provide the necessary information to predict a potential loss of separation? 
5. Rate your trust of the bands on the display? 
6. Were the number of alert icons during the past hour acceptable? 
7. Were the number of aural alerts during the past hour acceptable? 
 
Based on responses provided on the end-of-hour questionnaires and during the de-brief session on 
Day 2 of testing, Alerting Structure “A” was the preferred schema. Pilot subjects commented that 
Alerting Structure “A” was user-friendly and intuitive. Additionally, although some subjects also 
found Alerting Structure “B” to be user-friendly, the majority of them did not find having two 
“red” icons to be appealing. Multiple pilot subjects commented that simpler is better in terms of 
alerting structures. 
8. Phase II Discussion 
The research questions involved: 
 
A. Given a projected well clear loss, which of the three values evaluated is the minimum 
acceptable alert time? 
B. Given a projected well clear loss, which of the three values evaluated is the maximum 
acceptable alert time? 
C. Which, if any, of the alert times are too excessive leading to nuisance alerts for the UA pilots? 
D. Which, if any, of the alert times are too short providing insufficient time to query/negotiate 
maneuvers with ATC and execute said maneuvers before triggering TCAS RAs? 
E. Is there an interaction between Alerting Time and DTHR? 
F. Which of two alerting structures, with different use of auditory cues and icon colors, is 
preferred by the UA pilots? 
G. In Vertical Encounters, does prediction of time to co-altitude (TCOA) affect acceptability of 
the Alert? 
 
For Phase II, three Alert Times were tested in the DAIDALUS algorithm, and these included 40, 
60, and 75 seconds. The majority of ratings by the UAS pilots were in the “B = Timing Okay” 
category regardless of the Alert Time. As illustrated by Figures 12 to 14, very few rating responses 
occurred at either the “A = Too Early” or “C = Too Late” ends of the scale, regardless of the 
encounter geometry. These results suggest little change in perception of an acceptable alert time 
across the range of Alert Times evaluated. Based on these results, none of the values tested can be 
considered excessive, leading to a nuisance alert for the UAS pilot. Likewise, very few “Too Late” 
responses indicate that even the shortest Alert Time tested still provided enough time to negotiate 
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a maneuver. No consistent interaction between Alerting Time and DTHR was shown in the rating 
or CPA data sets for the lateral maneuver encounters. 
 
For the Vertical encounters, a different picture emerges from the Alert Time ratings. Here, a higher 
percentage of rating responses were found on the “C = Too Late” end of the scale than for lateral 
maneuvers. Despite this, the greatest frequency still occurred at the “B = Timing Okay” category, 
as in the lateral maneuver conditions. The CPA-DTHR difference was not affected by the TCOA 
value (see Figure 20).   
 
Of the total of 504 encounters for Phase II, only 17 (3.37%) had distance-based (CPA-DTHR) 
losses of well clear. These well clear losses occurred over all DTHR values and for all of the 
geometries under test. The most frequent cause was starting the traffic separation maneuver too 
late. Guidance for these maneuvers was guided by the navigation display bands. 
9. Conclusion 
This study evaluated a candidate DAA system with adjustable parameters from the perspective of 
both ATC and the UAS pilot. In Phase I, building on Controller Acceptability Studies (CAS) 1 
and 2, ATC acceptability ratings for DTHR of 0.7, 1.0 and 1.5 nmi showed the highest 
acceptability ratings for the 1.0 and 1.5 nmi DTHR values. DTHR ratings by active controllers 
were consistent with ratings by retired controllers in the earlier CAS-1 and CAS-2 studies. An 
Alert Time variable in the DAA software driving the UAS GCS displays did not show much effect 
on the ATC side in the ratings of the UAS maneuver request time ratings by ATC. 
 
In Phase II, UAS pilots requested maneuvers, or in some cases ATC contacted them first, and 
followed the DAA guidance at the GCS, and rated each of the DTHR values more frequently as 
“Neither too close nor too large” indicating less sensitivity to the distance than found on the part 
of the ATC controllers. For the crossing traffic condition and the 0.7 nmi DTHR, over 30% of the 
ratings were on the “too close” or “somewhat close” end of the scale. For the 1.0 nmi DTHR 
encounters, ratings on this end of the scale dropped to about 20%, and for the 1.5 nmi DTHR 
dropped to about 15%. Alert Timing rating results showed no consistent interaction with DTHR 
or with CPA for the lateral maneuvers. Specifics of the vertical maneuvers were discussed in an 
earlier section. 
 
The present study assumed perfect surveillance systems without positional error or uncertainty. 
Future studies, designed to inform the designers of DAA systems and critical parameters within 
them, need to incorporate sensor uncertainty and sensor effective range as variables of interest. 
Also of interest are simulation of failure modes, and especially from the ATC perspective, the 
maneuvers that a UAS would perform in a high traffic density environment if the communications 
or control link is lost. The aim of this work is to provide useful information for guiding future rules 
and regulations applicable to flying UAS in the NAS. 
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Appendix A – Air Traffic Operations Laboratory (ATOL) CASSAT Layout 
 
 
 
Key: 
 “Brief B/BB” Room – Briefing Room used in both Phase I and Phase II for initial 
briefing  
 
 “UAS/UA” Room – UAS in the NAS Lab (housed the pseudo-pilot background traffic 
stations and the pseudo-controller stations) 
 
 “ATC B/AB” Room – Air Traffic Controller Room (housed the ATC subject control 
station in Phase I and the ATC subject matter expert (part of the research team) in Phase 
II) 
 
 “Pilot Room B/PB” Room – UAS Pilot Room (housed the Ground Control Stations for 
flying the UAS aircraft; Phase I had pseudo-pilots from the research team flying the UAS 
aircraft and Phase II had the pilot subjects) 
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Appendix B – Phase I Initial Questionnaire 
 
Background experience 
1.  Please indicate the length of your overall ATC experience (years, e.g. 15)  ___________ 
2. Length of experience at current ATC Facility (years) _______________________ 
3. Which other airports have you worked? (3 most recent)  __________________________ 
4. Do you have experience in ATC operations with Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in 
U. S. airspace? 
(Yes / No) ________    Military/ Overseas? (Yes / No) __________ 
UAS with Certificates of Authorizations (COA)? (Yes / No) _______________________ 
 
5. Do you have experience as a pilot?  (Yes / No) _____ If yes, what types of aircraft and 
how many hours. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Do you have experience with RC (Radio Controlled) aircraft? (Yes / No)   ______ If yes, 
what types of RC aircraft. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
7. Comments on any of the above questions:  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Questions about today 
1. Do you have normal or corrected to normal vision? (Yes / No) __________ 
2. Do you have normal or aided to normal hearing? (Yes / No) __________ 
3. Do you feel adequately rested today?  (Yes/No) __________ 
4. Approximately how many hours of sleep did you get last night? __________ 
5. Did you travel from another time zone to get here? (Yes / No) __________ If yes, which 
time zone? __________ 
6. Comments on any of the above questions:  
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix C – Encounter Geometries from Phase I and Phase II 
Head-on Encounter Geometry 
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Crossing Encounter Geometry 
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Overtake Encounter Geometry 
 
 
 
Vertical-Crossing Encounter Geometry 
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Vertical-Overtake Encounter Geometry 
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Appendix D – Phase I Workload Ratings by Test Hour 
 
Workload assessment:  A modified version of the ATWIT (Air Traffic Workload Input 
Technique) method of Workload assessment was used.  When an aurally presented (through 
headphones) “Ding” occurred and the 1-6 rating scale turned yellow the subject responded by 
clicking on the desired number.  ATC Test subjects were briefed on definitions of the 1 to 6 scale 
during training and also had the scale definitions available during the test sessions. 
 
Table D- 1. Workload Rating Scale Definitions 
1 Minimal mental effort required 
2 Low mental effort required 
3 Moderate mental effort required 
4 High mental effort required 
5 Maximal mental effort required 
6 Intense mental effort required 
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Appendix E – Phase I End of Hour Questionnaire 
 
1. Rate the extent that communications delays with the Unmanned Aircraft affected your 
communications overall with BOTH manned and unmanned aircraft. 
__ Communications Delay was not a factor during this hour (no noticeable delay) 
__ Communications Delay, although noticed, did not impact traffic handling 
__ Communications Delay had some effect on communications (more repeats, “step-ons”) 
__ Communications Delay had a major impact on communications with many more repeats 
required 
__ Communications Delay had such a large effect that the amount of delay observed would 
not be acceptable in real world operations 
 
Comments:  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Rate the extent that communications delays with the Unmanned Aircraft affected your 
communications with ONLY the unmanned aircraft. 
__ Communications Delay was not a factor during this hour (no noticeable delay) 
__ Communications Delay, although noticed, did not impact traffic handling 
__ Communications Delay had some effect on communications (more repeats, “step-ons”) 
__ Communications Delay had a major impact on communications with many more repeats 
required 
__ Communications Delay had such a large effect that the amount of delay observed would 
not be acceptable in real world operations 
 
Comments:  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.  Rate the realism of the Traffic Density of the simulation during the preceding hour.  (Check 
one line below) 
__ Traffic Density was significantly higher than in real operations 
__ Traffic Density was somewhat higher than real world operations 
__ Traffic Density was about the same as would be found in real world operations 
__ Traffic Density was somewhat lower than real world operations 
__ Traffic Density was significantly lower than in real world operations 
 
Comments:  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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4.  Rate the realism of the Workload of the simulation during the preceding hour.  (Check one 
line below) 
__ Workload was significantly higher than in real operations 
__ Workload was somewhat higher than real world operations 
__ Workload was about the same as would be found in real world operations 
__ Workload was somewhat lower than real world operations 
__ Workload was significantly lower than in real world operations 
 
Comments:  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.  Rate the realism of the Communications Rate during the preceding hour of the simulation 
environment.   (Check one line below) 
__ Communications Rate was significantly higher than in real operations 
__ Communications Rate was somewhat higher than real world operations 
__ Communications Rate was about the same as would be found in real world operations 
__ Communications Rate was somewhat lower than real world operations 
__ Communications Rate was significantly lower than in real world operations 
 
Comments:  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.  Were there encounters that had aircraft too close to be acceptable in the operational 
environment? 
__ Yes 
__ No 
 
Comments:  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.  Were there encounters that had aircraft too far apart to be acceptable in the operational 
environment? 
__ Yes 
__ No 
 
Comments:  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix F – Phase II Initial Questionnaire 
 
Background experience 
1.  What pilot certifications do you have? (Choose all that apply) 
 
A) Private 
B) Commercial 
C) Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) 
D) None 
E) Other (please list below): 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. What pilot ratings/certifications do you have? (Choose all that apply) 
 
A) SEL 
B) MEL 
C) Instrument 
D) CFI 
E) CFII 
F) Helicopter 
G) None 
H) Other (please list below): 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Top four aircraft (manned and/or unmanned) you have flown (by hours) 
 
1. _____________________, __________ Hours 
2. _____________________, __________ Hours 
3. _____________________, __________ Hours 
4. _____________________, __________ Hours 
 
4. How many manned flight hours and years of experience do you have? 
__________ Flight Hours 
__________ Years 
 
5. How many unmanned flight hours and years of experience do you have? 
__________ Flight Hours 
__________ Years 
 
6. Do you have experience flying in a mixed operations environment (unmanned aircraft and 
general/commercial aircraft in same airspace)? 
 
A) Yes 
B) No 
 42 
 
7. Have you had any experience operating an unmanned aircraft (or remotely controlled aircraft) 
before today? 
 
A) Yes 
B) No 
 
If yes, in a simulation environment (comparable to this experiment) or in real life? And 
how many hours/years? 
A) Simulation Environment:     B) Real Life: 
_____________ Hours          ______________ Hours 
_____________ Years          ______________ Years 
 
8. What types of UAS have you flown? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. What type of training, specific to UAS, did you receive prior to today? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Comments on any of the above questions:  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
Questions about today 
1. Do you have normal or corrected to normal vision? (Yes / No) __________ 
2. Do you have normal or aided to normal hearing? (Yes / No) __________ 
3. Do you feel adequately rested today?  (Yes/No) __________ 
4. Approximately how many hours of sleep did you get last night? __________ 
5. Did you travel from another time zone to get here? (Yes / No) __________ 
a. If yes, which time zone? __________ 
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Appendix G – Phase II Secondary Task Questions for Sessions 1-3 
 
  
Secondary Task Questions for Set 1 
  
GCS Call Sign Time Cutoff Question Correct? 
Conflict 
Declaration 
RA 
Action Timing HMD 
1 
Radix51 201 246 
What is the identifer 
for Bishops Landing?  
T80 
          
1 
Radix51 261 306 
What airport is closest 
to the town of 
Prosper?  Aero 
Country 
          
2 JIFFY43 438 483 
What airport has the 
identifier T33?  Rives 
          
2 
JIFFY43 498 543 
What is the identifier 
of the Mesquite 
Airport?  HQZ 
          
1 
Flyby18 674 719 
What airport has the 
Identifier T31?  Aero 
Country 
          
1 
Flyby18 734 779 
How long is the Four 
Winds runway?  
2600ft 
          
2 
Noble61 945 990 
What airport is closest 
to the town of Van 
Alstyne 
          
2 
Noble61 1005 1050 
How long is the 
Square Air runway?  
1800ft 
          
1 
Diode11 1158 1203 
What airport has the 
Identifier TKI?  
Mckinney 
          
1 
Diode11 1218 1263 
What airport is closest 
to the town of 
Melissa?  Square Air 
          
2 
Float28 1408 1453 
How long is the 
Tilghman runway?  
3100ft 
          
2 
Float28 1468 1513 
Which airport is 
closest to the town of 
Celina? 
          
1 Rondo19 1634 1679 
How long is the Casey 
runway? 
          
1 Rondo19 1694 1739 
How long is the Stone 
runway? 
          
2 
Hack60 1862 1907 
What airport is closest 
to the town of 
Westminster?  Flying 
T 
          
2 
Hack60 1922 1967 
What airport has the 
identifier of 9S1?  
Four Winds 
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Secondary Task Questions for Set 1 
  
GCS Call Sign Time Cutoff Question Correct? 
Conflict 
Declaration 
RA 
Action Timing HMD 
1 
Lock58 2113 2158 
What airport is closest 
to the town of 
Farmersville?  Short 
Stop 
          
1 
Lock58 2173 2218 
What is the ASOS 
frequency for 
Mckinney? 
          
2 
Harpo65 2362 2407 
Which airport is 
closest to the town of 
Allen?  McKinney 
          
2 
Harpo65 2422 2467 
What is the identifier 
of the Majors Airport?  
GVT 
          
1 
Jazz35 2577 2622 
Which airport is 
closest to the town of 
Anna?  Stone 
          
1 
Jazz35 2637 2682 
How long is the 
AeroCountry runway?  
2900ft 
          
2 
Kilts49 2839 2884 
How long is the 
Denton runway?  
7000ft 
          
2 Kilts49 2899 2944 
What is the Identifier 
of Ironhead?  T58 
          
1 
Shark54 3075 3120 
What is the name of 
the lake next to 
McKinney?  Lake 
Lavon 
          
1 
Shark54 3135 3180 
Which airport is 
closest to the town 
of Valdasta?  Stone 
          
2 
Flux40 3293 3338 
What airport is closest 
to Pilot Point?  
Venable 
          
2 
Flux40 3353 3398 
What airport has the 
identifier T80?  
Bishops Landing 
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Secondary Task Questions Set2 
  
GCS Call Sign Time Cutoff Question Correct? 
Conflict 
Declaration 
RA 
Action Timing HMD 
1 Cozy51 240 285 Approximately How far is the 
town of Valdasta to Collin 
County?  10 miles 
          
1 Cozy51 300 345 What airport is closest to the 
town of Celeste?  Card 
          
2 Mojo43 431 476 What is the runway length of 
Rockwall?  3400ft 
          
2 Mojo43 491 536 What kind of operations are 
likely at Caddo Mills?  
Skydiving 
          
1 Check18 686 731 What airport has the identifier 
6XB?  Viltures Row 
          
1 Check18 746 791 What lake is is next to the 
town of Tioga?  Ray Roberts 
Lake 
          
2 Quark61 920 965 What is the runway length of 
Garland/DFW*  It’s a heliport 
          
2 Quark61 988 1033 What is AirPark East's 
identifier?  1F7 
          
1 Ibex11 1169 1214 How long is the the Rives 
runway?  2800ft 
          
1 Ibex11 1229 1274 What airport has the identifier 
T48? Phillips 
          
2 Rover28 
1382 1427 
What airport is closest to the 
town of Whitewright?  Rowland 
or TriCounty 
          
2 Rover28 1442 1487 What town is closest to the 
airport of Tilghman?  Van 
Alstyne 
          
1 Rivet19 1660 1705 What airport is closest to the 
town of Merit?  Short Stop 
          
1 Rivet19 1720 1765 How long is the Lavon North 
Runway?  2600ft 
          
2 Mist60 1820 1865 Name 3 towns near highway 
30.  Royse City, Greenville, 
Rockwall 
          
2 Mist60 1880 1925 Approximately how far is the 
Rockwall Airport to McKinney? 
~12miles 
          
1 Kitty58 2118 2163 What is the identifier of 
Vultures Row?  6XB 
          
1 Kitty58 2178 2223 How long is the Lane Runway?  
3300ft 
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Secondary Task Questions Set2 
  
GCS Call Sign Time Cutoff Question Correct? 
Conflict 
Declaration 
RA 
Action Timing HMD 
2 Expo65 2348 2393 Which airport is closest to the 
town of Nevada?  Caddo Mills 
          
2 Expo65 2408 2453 How long is the Collin Co 
Regional Runway?  7000ft 
          
1 Saber35 2560 2605 Which airport is closest to the 
town of Aubrey?  Venable 
          
1 Saber35 2652 2697 Is the Lane airport runway 
paved?  No 
          
2 Gizmo49 2800 2845 What kind of operations are 
likely at the Tri County 
airport?  Skydiving 
          
2 Gizmo49 2860 2905 Which airport is closest to the 
town of Collinsville?  Sudden 
Stop 
          
1 Glaze54 3052 3097 Which airport is closest to the 
town of Howe?  TX Aerosport 
          
1 Glaze54 3112 3157 How long is the Bridges 
runway?  3200ft 
          
2 Lazy40 3310 3355 How many runways does 
Caddo Mills have?  2 
          
2 Lazy40 3364 3409 Which airport is closest to the 
town of Garland?  
Rockwall/Garland DFW 
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Secondary Task Questions Set3 
  
GCS Call Sign Time Cutoff Question Correct? 
Conflict 
Declaration 
RA 
Action Timing HMD 
1 
Amaze51 211 256 
Which airport is closest to 
the town of Valley View? The 
88 
          
1 
Amaze51 271 316 
What is the elevation of the 
tallest tower currently 
visible on your map?  2726ft 
          
2 
Maven43 446 491 Is the Bishop runway 
paved? Yes 
          
2 
Maven43 506 551 How long is the Flying T 
runway?  3500ft 
          
1 
Exam18 686 731 Is the Bishop's Landing 
runway paved?  No 
          
1 
Exam18 746 791 
Which airport is closest to 
the town of Dorchester?  TX 
Aerosport 
          
2 
Quail61 925 970 How long is the Short Stop 
runway?  1500ft 
          
2 
Quail61 985 1030 
What lake is next to the 
town of Farmersville?  Lake 
Lavon 
          
1 
Raven11 1320 1365 Is the Rocky runway paved?  
No 
          
1 
Raven11 1380 1425 Which airport is closest to 
the town of Kingston?  Card 
          
2 
Lever28 1403 1448 Is the Lakeview runway 
paved?  Yes 
          
2 
Lever28 1463 1508 How long is the Mustang 
runway?  1800ft 
          
1 
Kayak19 1633 1678 How long is the Hennington 
Runway?  2800ft 
          
1 
Kayak19 1693 1738 
Which airport is closest to 
the town of Randolph?  
Grove Hill 
          
2 
Dojo60 1859 1904 Which airport has the 
Identifier 1F7?  AirPark East 
          
2 
Dojo60 1919 1964 How long is the Flying M 
Runway?  1900ft 
          
1 
Ajax58 2132 2177 Is the Pleasure runway 
paved?  No 
          
1 
Ajax58 2192 2237 How long is the Horseshoe 
Lake Runway?  2700ft 
          
2 
Muzle65 2490 2535 Which airport is closest to 
the town of Wylie?  Rockwall 
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Secondary Task Questions Set3 
  
GCS Call Sign Time Cutoff Question Correct? 
Conflict 
Declaration 
RA 
Action Timing HMD 
2 
Muzle65 2550 2595 
What airport is closest to the 
town of Caddo Mills?  Caddo 
Mills 
          
1 
Nole35 2589 2634 Which airport is closest to 
the town of Tioga?  Bridges 
          
1 
Nole35 2649 2694 How long is the Robotek 
runway?  1200ft 
          
2 
Jumpy49 2842 2887 
Which airport is closest to 
the town of Lebanon?  
Airpark Dallas 
          
2 
Jumpy49 2902 2947 
How long is the Wesse 
International runway?  
5300ft 
          
1 
Ninja54 3070 3115 
Which airport is closest ot 
the town of Wolfe City?  
Hennington 
          
1 
Ninja54 3130 3175 How long is the Card 
Runway? 
          
2 
Index40 3283 3328 Which airport has the 
identifier T14?  Taylor 
          
2 
Index40 3343 3388 Is the Skinner runway 
paved?  No 
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Appendix H – Phase II Post-encounter Questionnaire 
 
 
1.  Timing of the Alert (mark anywhere on the line) 
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|  
Alerted too soon About Right Alerted too late  
 
2. Horizontal Miss Distance Guidance (mark anywhere on the line) 
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|  
Much too close                                              About Right                                                           Much too wide  
 
3. Navigation Scale selected for most for this encounter (nmi)  
__ 2.5 __ 5 __ 10 __ 20 __ 40 __ 80  
 
4. Alert Level Information        
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|  
“too quiet”                                                     About Right                                                                 “too chatty”  
few levels/changes                                                                                                                     too many level /changes  
 
5. See Any False Alerts? (___ ) Yes (___) No  Comment: ______________________________  
 
6. See Any Missed Alerts? (___ ) Yes (___) No Comment: _____________________________  
 
7. Workload  
 
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|  
Low (0)                                                                      50                                                                        High (100)  
 
8. Time Pressure 
 
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|  
Low (0)                                                                      50                                                                        High (100)  
 
Comments: _________________________________________________________________  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix I – Phase II Post-run Questionnaire 
 
1. Rate the extent that communications delays with Air Traffic Control (ATC) affected your 
communications overall. 
__ Communications Delay was not a factor during this hour (no noticeable delay) 
__ Communications Delay, although noticed, did not impact traffic handling 
__ Communications Delay had some effect on communications (more repeats, “step-ons”) 
__ Communications Delay had a major impact on communications with many more repeats 
required 
__ Communications Delay had such a large effect that the amount of delay observed would 
not be acceptable in real world operations 
 
Comments:  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.  Rate the realism of the Workload of the simulation during the preceding hour.  (Check one 
line below) 
__ Workload was significantly higher than in real operations 
__ Workload was somewhat higher than real world operations 
__ Workload was about the same as would be found in real world operations 
__ Workload was somewhat lower than real world operations 
__ Workload was significantly lower than in real world operations 
 
Comments:  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.  Were there encounters that had aircraft too close to be acceptable in the operational 
environment? 
__ Yes 
__ No 
 
Comments:  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.  Were there encounters that had aircraft too far apart to be acceptable in the operational 
environment? 
__ Yes 
__ No 
 
Comments:  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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5. Rate your ability to maintain separation from other aircraft. 
 
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|  
Too Easy                               Moderate      Too 
Difficult 
 
Comments: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Rate your ability to minimize deviations from the planned path. 
 
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|  
Too Easy                               Moderate      Too 
Difficult 
 
Comments: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Rate your ability to handle all pilot tasks (including the secondary tasks). 
 
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|  
Too Easy                               Moderate      Too 
Difficult 
 
Comments: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Rate the complexity of the encounters during the past hour. 
 
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|  
Not Complicated                               Moderate      Too 
Complicated 
 
Comments: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Rate the ease of use of the display. 
 
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|  
Too Easy                               Moderate      Too 
Difficult 
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Comments: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Rate the ease of use of the alerting structure. 
 
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|  
Too Easy                               Moderate      Too 
Difficult 
 
Comments: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Was the display user-friendly? 
 
              __ Yes 
  __ No 
 
Comments: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Did the display provide the necessary information to predict a potential loss of separation? 
 
             __ Yes 
  __ No 
 
Comments: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
13. Rate your trust of the bands on the display. 
 
 |-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|  
Low (0)          50      High (100) 
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Comments: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Were the number of alert icons during the past hour acceptable? 
 
             __ Yes 
  __ No 
 
Comments: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Were the number of aural alerts during the past hour acceptable? 
 
              __ Yes 
  __ No 
 
Comments: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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